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  • Essay / Proposed Integrated Model for Our Armed Sources

    Table of ContentsExisting SystemService HQDisadvantages of Existing SystemSuggested OrganizationsOrganization at MOD/Inter-Services LevelExisting SystemThe current logistics systems of the three services remain separate and there is considerable scope to improve the delivery of support logistics through better inter-departmental arrangements. A number of measures have already been taken to implement inter-service cooperation in the field of logistics and to streamline single-service logistics zones. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essayThe Joint Administrative Planning Committee (JAPC), composed of representatives from the services, reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC). The JAPC is responsible for preparing a joint administrative plan to complement and support the overall mobilization and operation plan developed by the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), for any future operation or contingency plan involving two or more services. Secretarial support is provided by the military branch of the Ministry of Defense (MOD), which is totally insufficient to say the least. Although all future operations will be joint in nature, currently each service plans its requirements in isolation, without the concerted action of a joint approach. Certain logistical functions, of a static nature and not really affecting combat effectiveness, have already been integrated. Medical services, postal services, the work of the MES (Military Engineering Service), the embarkation staff, the organization of defense and cantonment grounds and the canteen. The Stores Department provides support to all three departments. The Navy and Air Force also depend on the Army for everyday goods such as armaments, ammunition, vehicles, general stores and clothing. These arrangements resulted in economy of effort and unity of purpose. However, there are a number of areas in the current logistics support system that are open to integration and collaboration to achieve synergies in operations[1]. At the MOD level, the two important entities in the field of logistics are the Production Department of the Ministry of Defense. and Committee of Supply and Defense Research and Development Board. The role of the Production and Supply Committee is the most important as it covers the full range of planning force levels and equipment planning related to resource availability. The COSC advises the Minister of Defense on all military matters, including logistical matters. As mentioned earlier, the JAPC, under the direction of the COSC, is expected to coordinate the logistics effort of the three services. Services HQ At Army Headquarters, the agencies responsible for providing logistics are organized under four different PSOs (Principal Staff Officers), namely the Adjutant General (AG), Quartermaster General (QMG) , Master General of Artillery (MGO) and Chief Engineer. This could also mean that the management and control of logistics services is not a single, unified management or control. This gives rise to a number of intra-army logistical problems. The QMG branch is responsible for a large part of logistics planning. It uses almost two-fifths of the army's budget. In the Air Force, the Logistics Branch ensures all management and distribution functions for equipment and materials. At Air Headquarters, the administration of the officer in charge of the air and the officer in chargeAir Maintenance Charge (AOM) perform functions similar to those of the Air Force. AG and QMG in the army and partly similar to those of MGO in the army. The AOM therefore ensures to a large extent centralized management and control of these activities. The formation of the “Initial Procurement Committee” and “Maintenance Planning Teams” provides logistical support to newly introduced aircraft and weapon systems. Apparently, these arrangements militate against integrated logistics support as such activity conveys an “after the fact” approach. The Air Force spends nearly 60 percent of its budget on stores. In the Navy, the chief materiel officer is responsible for maintenance and logistical support, armaments procurement, naval projects, engineering, electrical and weapons systems, and naval stores procurement. The Chief of Staff assumes responsibilities related to medical services, recruiting, conditions of service, clothing and welfare and uses more than half of the naval budget. Even in the Navy, logistical support for newly introduced equipment is planned and organized after the selection and ordering of the new equipment by the user directorates and, therefore, this procedure lends itself to being called "discipline after the fact". of the existing systemAt present, there is considerable divergence in procurement, storage, maintenance and support functions. This leads to a lack of standardization, overstocking and increased inventory costs. There is duplication in some areas of logistics where common items and weapon systems are used in more than one service. Although some overlap may be unavoidable, streamlining logistics in common areas would prove fruitful. In addition to organizational weaknesses, there are weaknesses in political and logistical infrastructure. There is a lack of an overall national perspective on logistics. National-level decision-making structures are either inappropriate or insensitive. The Siachen episode in 1998, where the Defense Minister had to send bureaucrats to Siachen to understand the troops' need for snow scooters, indicates the level of awareness of the logistical needs of the services at the higher echelons of development of policies. Furthermore, in the second half of 1995, an excerpt from a memo sent to the valley's army chief observed: “Public funds are increasingly being thrown out the window. There are apparently no qualms in condoning such actions where billions of dollars are padded at will without any accountability, while the Valley troops have actually offered to forfeit a certain percentage of their ration if the funds were insufficient to purchase bulletproof vests. » And to further compound the problems, the body armor purchased from the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) was very heavy and bulky, limiting the mobility and agility of the troops in operations. counter-insurgency[2]. The weaknesses of the current logistics system can be summarized as follows: Service chiefs are responsible for operational and logistical preparation, but exercise little or no control over the budget and procurement of war materiel. General VP Malik's statement during the Kargil War that "we will fight with everything we have" testifies to the lack of long-term logistical planning and an overall national perspective. Although a new budget management policy was introduced in September 1998, providing for the delegation of powersfinancial to the chiefs, vice-chiefs and commanders of the army and their equivalents in the two other armies, these measures did not go far enough. The Arun Singh Committee on Defense Expenditure (CDE) of 1990 had made numerous recommendations and proposals aimed at promoting rapid response and accountability. It was recommended that all tax expenditures, except in certain areas, fall within the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. After the 2016 DPP, certain financial powers were granted to the vice-chief in charge of emergency procurement. There is a lack of links between the country's development plans and defense needs. There is no national level organization to oversee, coordinate and integrate defense needs into national development. There is little evidence that national-level logistics planning is carried out with defense in mind. The three services have not developed a common logistics doctrine or philosophy regarding logistics support. Interaction and intercommunication between the three services in terms of logistics is limited. Sometimes parochial considerations dominate decision-making, which runs counter to the demands of organizational economics. There is a multiplicity of logistics agencies with no single authority responsible for logistics preparation. Lack of centralized logistical support encourages duplication and waste of spending. Multiple agencies purchasing services, with a lack of interaction, go against the principle of economy and lead to increased costs. Sometimes bureaucratic delays lead to rising costs and even inappropriate and inadequate purchases. Long lead times lead to functional inefficiencies and losses, particularly when changes are made after orders have been placed with supplying agencies. There is a lack of standardization and codification. This leads to duplication and high inventory. There are several storage tiers, which leads to a high storage level. And this is further compounded by the lack of an integrated systems approach to determining inventory levels. The three services have separately undertaken automation in the field of logistics. For example, inventory automation by the Army, Air Force, and Navy was undertaken separately despite the similarity in procedures. A common system would have been more economical. Suggested Organizations At the national level, there is a need to create an NLC on the lines of the National Development Council. The Minister of Defense could be its president. Alternatively, the vice chair of the planning commission may head this board. The three services could be represented there or the CDL could be the representative. The council is expected to comprise representatives from the Ministry of Finance, Industrial Development Board, Department of Science and Technology, representatives from the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII). The list is not exhaustive; there could be more members directly affected by logistics infrastructure. The NLC should develop five-year logistics plans in line with national five-year plans. It should also develop long-term plans over 10 to 15 years. These short and long term prospective plans should be integrated with the prospective plans of the defense services and should include proposals for such dual purpose projects, which also contribute to the development of the economy. This would be possible in areas such as road construction, railways, airfields, canals, networks 1991).