On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped the first atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima. To this day, this military strategy remains controversial. Those who believe that the United States was right to use the atomic bomb argue that more lives were saved and that the vigor and willingness of the Japanese to fight to the death forced the United States to take extreme measures. On the other hand, those who believed that the use of the atomic bomb was unjustified argue that the atomic bomb violated the principles of war, that it did not end World War II (WWII ) earlier and was not the ideal choice to use for World War II. Looking at proponents of U.S. use of the atomic bomb, such as Hugh A. Halliday and Richard Frank, military historians, and Michael Kort, professor of social sciences at Boston University, as well as opponents , which political analyst John Siebert, Martin J. Sherwin, professor at George Mason University, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor emeritus of history at the University of California, intend to evaluate and summarize both sides of the debate over whether the United States was justified in dropping the atomic bomb. Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get the original essay Proponents of the use of the atomic bomb argue that if the atomic bomb had not been dropped and the initial ground invasion had been implemented, more lives on both sides would have been lost. Japan's refusal to surrender left the United States unsure of what it would take to end the war. To discuss these points, we will consider the arguments of Hugh A. Halliday, a military historian who served with the RCAF Air Historian, the Directorate of Canadian Forces History and the Museum Canadian War, by Michael Kort, professor of social sciences at Boston University. , and Richard B. Frank, a military historian who served nearly four years in the U.S. Army. Japan had a strong belief that the purpose of life was to die for the emperor, which was seen not only in its activists but also in its civilians. civilian losses ranging from 42,000 to 150,000 deaths by suicide or in combat. Land invasion of the Japanese islands was an option considered by the American government. However, estimates by General Douglas MacArthur, who favored a land invasion, reduced the number of casualties to around 130,000; however, this did not include the 300,000 Allied prisoners of war (PoW) or enemy civilian casualties. In addition to the ground invasion and bombing, the United States planned to use a blockade that was expected to cause famine, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians. Although approximately 200,000 people were killed by the atomic bomb, it remained the morally preferred choice over the estimated deaths from an invasion. However, Michael Kort argues that it was never a question of deciding to use the atomic bomb rather than implementing a ground invasion, but rather what it would take for Japan to capitulate. The United States had been bombing Japan for three years before the Potsdam Declaration. It had already suffered around 806,000 casualties in Okinawa and Tokyo. And yet, when the United States obtained the Potsdam Declaration that gave Japan a chance to surrender, it not only chose to ignore it, but also sought to negotiate with the Soviet Union, to the point of gain alliance benefits. Thus, the United States hoped that theThe sheer destructive power of the atomic bomb could persuade Japan to surrender and thus end World War II. Was the United States right to use the atomic bomb? violation of the principles of war as well as the Geneva Protocol, which prohibited the use of chemical weapons in war. Furthermore, in response to the belief that the atomic bomb would lead to a shortening of World War II, the reason Japan surrendered was because of the USSR's declaration of war against it and the invasion of lands occupied by Japan. Furthermore, if the United States had amended the Potsdam Declaration, Japan would have been more inclined to accept its terms. To analyze these arguments, we will discuss the arguments of John Siebert, a political analyst who worked at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Human Rights and Indigenous Justice with the United Church of Canada as well as a consultant to governmental and non-governmental organizations. organizations, Martin J. Sherwin, Pulitzer winner and professor of history at George Mason University, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, professor emeritus of history at the University of California. There are arguably commonly accepted principles of warfare, such as not directly targeting non-military, non-militant establishments. However, the United States knowingly targeted civilian cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And if Henry L. Stimson, former U.S. Secretary of War, had not opposed the Target committee, they would have chosen Kyoto, the center of Japanese civilization for over a thousand years. Additionally, after the practice of mustard gas as well as other chemical weapons during World War I, the Geneva Protocol was created and signed by members of the League of Nations, prohibiting the use of chemical weapons in times of war. But even though the United States was aware of the radiation poisoning the atomic bomb would cause, it was deployed nonetheless. By harnessing the atomic bomb, the United States indicated that nuclear weapons were valid weapons of war. Aside from the moral discretions related to the use of the atomic bomb, the argument that the atomic bomb led to the end of World War II earlier is invalid. Because the USSR declared war on Japan and invaded Japanese-controlled lands, Japan could not ensure successful fighting on both fronts and therefore surrendered. Ward Wilson, senior researcher and director of Re-thinking Nuclear Weapons, noted that Japanese leaders said it was the atomic bomb that led to their surrender because it was less embarrassing to lose to a miracle weapon. Moreover, Japanese military officials claimed that they could convince the USSR to negotiate better surrender terms than the unconditional surrender provided for in the Potsdam Declaration. However, with the declaration of war, they no longer had any reason to continue the war. At the same time, if the United States had adjusted its Potsdam Declaration to indicate that the Emperor would not be held responsible for the war under unconditional surrender, then perhaps Japan would have agreed. Indeed, his goal of surrender was to preserve its imperial system and Japan was already known for holding its emperor to a high standard. Although Secretary of War Stimson recommended this adjustment; Unfortunately, Secretary of State James Byrnes vetoed it. Although the amendment was attempted but vetoed, the United States could have invited the USSR to sign the Potsdam Declaration, which would show Japan that it could not rely on the USSR to help him. THEProponents of the use of the atomic bomb argue that the bomb saved more. more lives than the planned ground invasion and, due to Japan's reluctance to abandon the war despite very unfavorable odds, the United States was forced to take drastic action. The willingness of the Japanese people to perish for their emperor was unsettling and resulted in many civilian casualties before even considering dropping the atomic bomb. This disposition to die rather than be a prisoner is one of the teachings of bushido, a legacy and code of ethics of the samurai. The Japanese were taught from an early age bushido and the worship of the emperor, a descendant of the sun goddess. Because of this disregard for being prisoners of war, the Japanese would often fight until they were killed or committed suicide. American soldiers would witness the horror of Japanese mothers holding their children and choosing to jump to their death rather than be taken prisoner. The United States believed that a land invasion would not only result in losses for the Allied powers but also a high casualty rate due to the extreme devotion of the Japanese to their emperor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that the United States would experience 1.2 million casualties for the entire ground invasion operation, while Navy Department staff estimated between 1.7 and 4 million victims (Trueman). These estimates were significantly higher than the approximately 200,000 people killed by the atomic bomb. It was not known at the time, but it was later discovered that the Japanese military had formed a civilian militia of approximately 28 million men and women to defend the home islands in the event of a land invasion (Giangreco). A year after the dropping of the atomic bomb, Karl T. Compton, a member of Truman's interim committee — "a committee charged with advising the president on matters relating to the use of nuclear energy and weapons" (Historic Site national Harry S Truman) — interviewed a Japanese army officer asking if they could have repelled Operation Downfall, to which the officer responded: "...I don't think we could have stopped you." When asked what the Japanese would have done, the officer replied, "We would have continued to fight until all the Japanese were killed, but we would not have been defeated," which means the shame of capitulation (Compton). The Japanese imperial system was corrupted by the influence of military officials who strongly desired to continue fighting despite the extremely detrimental situation in which the country found itself. Despite 806,000 casualties in Okinawa and Tokyo, when the United States issued its Potsdam Declaration, Japan chose to try to invoke aid from the USSR, which had delicate relations with the United States. And after dropping the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and being given a three-day grace period to respond, senior Japanese military officials felt it was unlikely the United States would have another bomb. Even when Nagasaki was bombed, military officials refused to accept surrender, although the emperor now suggested accepting American terms. It was only a few days of continuous bombing after the use of the atomic bombs that the emperor firmly declared that Japan would effectively abandon the war. So while the Japanese surrender may have had implications, it was unlikely that they would have surrendered given the stubbornness of the army. That said, those who opposed the exploitation of the atomic bomb by the United States disputed the fact that the United States had..