It has been said that the success of any democracy depends on the participation of its citizens. Indeed, our governmental, economic and social institutions (explicit or not) require the conscious and informed participation of everyone. We are the juries of our peers. We vote for our political representatives. We celebrate our communities and mourn those who have fallen. Our lives are full of situations that require us to express our opinions, our feelings, and our best judgment. Therein lies the need for rhetoric, a means by which we might offer these things and understand what these things require of us in the first place. Given the “need” for rhetoric, which author – Plato, Aristotle, Burke – seems to provide the most valuable insight? In other words, if our citizenship requires the use of rhetoric in the normal course of our lives, what view of rhetoric might prove most useful? Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an Original Essay The central activity of rhetoric, of course, is the physical act of offering our opinions and best judgments: speech with the intent to persuade. The basic concept of rhetorical study is therefore an inspection of the means by which one will persuade one's audience. In my opinion, the most important aspect of one of our authors' rhetorical concepts is that of "audience" (where an audience is the collective recipient of the speaker's machinations). In fact, it is through each author's examination of this concept – of the centrality of the audience in a functional concept of rhetoric – that I will proceed to compare the three major views of rhetoric and decide how much of sight is the most valuable. I consider the author's treatment and understanding of the audience to be the best indicator of the value of his conception of rhetoric. In this light, the Burkean concept of rhetoric seems to be the most valuable. He does not completely abandon Aristotelian or Platonic conceptions of rhetoric, but rather redefines these conceptions by placing the audience at the center of his considerations. To support this, I will briefly explain the Platonic and Aristotelian concepts of rhetoric and highlight how these views view the role of the audience. Next, I will compare these views with the Burkean ideal, showing why this view is, in my opinion, the most valuable. The Platonic concept of rhetoric is born (or, rather, is inhabited by) Plato's contempt for the group of Greeks. rhetoricians known as Sophists. This animosity is the result of Plato's belief that the sophists became educators more interested in winning their arguments and promoting their personal interests than in defining and teaching rhetoric as a practical and useful skill (Boyd). In Gorgias, Plato takes the sophists to task and constructs a dialogue that accuses rhetoric of false competence, that does not improve its audience but merely exercises flattery. This dialogue takes the form of an argument between Gorgias and Socrates, since Socrates asks Gorgias to define rhetoric. Gorgias claims that rhetoric is “responsible for the freedom of man himself, and at the same time for the domination of others in his own city” (452d6-7). This is, coincidentally, a valuable point about the importance of rhetoric in democracy; if we want to govern ourselves, we must use rhetoric to govern. The concern of rhetoric is “persuasion, and that the whole of its business and the sum of it result in this” (453a3-4). Gorgias therefore conceives the practice of rhetoric assomething substantial useful. Socrates, however, questions the validity of Gorgias's notions. He asks: “Can you mention any wider power of rhetoric than that of producing persuasion in the souls of the hearers? (453a4-5). For Socrates, the purpose of rhetoric is only to instill beliefs and persuade; in other words, it does not produce understanding or knowledge in the listener and is therefore a ignoble skill.(455a1-2). He argues that the ultimate goal of the speaker is that of flattery, not the conviction of an honest truth in his audience. The production of an argument of truth, says Socrates, belongs to philosophers and not to rhetoricians. It is in Gorgias's defense of rhetoric that the Platonic notion of the public begins to emerge. Gorgias claims that rhetoric is a powerful art and that the rhetorician is vested with great power to "speak against anyone on anything, in order to be more persuasive among the masses of people on, in short, everything that 'he wants' (457a6-8). . Gorgias claims that the rhetor is well aware of justice and truth, but Socrates refutes this notion, asserting instead that the rhetor “merely seems to know, rather than the man who knows” (459e7). In light of these conceptions, the Platonic view of the rhetor's audience is like that of a blank canvas on which the rhetor is able to paint his own opinions. In all of Gorgias's dialogues, no character refutes the perception that the audience is somewhat vulnerable, unable to distinguish flattery from substance. In fact, much of the interaction between Gorgias and Sophocles is spurred by Gorgias's promises that the rhetoricians will use their seemingly all-powerful skills for good and not for malice. Furthermore, the interests of Plato's audience are neglected; the audience appears to be made up of reluctant spectators demanding to be convinced by gentle flattery rather than strong, skillfully executed arguments. Indeed, this reaction to flattery seems to be the only obligation of the Platonic audience. Contrary to this view of the speaker-audience dynamic as being essentially one-sided (except the audience's approval of being flattered), the Aristotelian concept of rhetoric requires the rhetor to establish a measure of credibility with his audience and , thus, grants the audience agency. In On Rhetoric, Aristotle sets out his theory of rhetoric – rhetoric, once again, concerned with persuasion – as a technical craft relying on three “modes” of persuasion. The first, ethos, depends on the character of the speaker; the second, pathetic, about bringing the audience into a certain state of mind; the third, logos, on logical proof. Ethos is achieved when the speaker establishes credibility; the person we perceive as “good” is more credible than the person we perceive as “bad.” Pathos is based on the fact that our emotions have a big impact on our decision-making. An audience put into a friendly or happy disposition by a speaker will likely be much more receptive than one that is angry or disinterested. Logos is based on the irrefutable and effective nature of logic. If, for example, we argue that 2 - 1 = 1 and are able to prove that 1 + 1 = 2, it follows that our argument 2 - 1 = 1 must be true. If persuasion is the goal of rhetoric, Aristotle argues, these three modes are the means by which we might achieve that persuasion. “It is clear,” says Aristotle, “that understanding them is the function of one who can reason logically and be attentive to characters, virtues and, thirdly, emotions” (1356a). Aristotle's approach to defining rhetoricvalues ​​the public, contrary to the Platonic concept. This is illustrated in Aristotle's ethos mode, the first element of a rhetorical view, thus far, that deals primarily with the audience. The audience becomes, at least to a minimal extent, mobilized, participating in shaping the rhetor's argument by attributing credibility and value to the speaker's personal character. For Aristotle, the power to persuade effectively does not belong only to the speaker (as Gorgias says). The audience also holds the power to judge the character of the speaker before opening to their arguments. In fact, ethos is the first of the three modes of Aristotelian rhetoric because it is the mode which serves as a condition for the others; without credibility, the speaker's efforts at pathos and logos fall on deaf ears. The pathos mode could be seen as more or less similar to Socrates' (Gorgias's) belief that rhetoric relies on flattery. But the main difference between this belief and the Aristotelian concept is the extent to which the public is allowed to choose its own disposition. The pathos of the Platonic public seems fundamental; more flattering, and they will receive their arguments with acceptance. Aristotle addresses audience disposition by recognizing that there is more to temperament than being happy or sad (like invoking sympathy or attempting to arouse audience interest in the subject to begin with). The Burkean concept of rhetoric places even greater emphasis on the audience. Burke defines rhetoric as “the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or move other human agents to action” (41). In fact, understanding one's audience ("human agents") is at the heart of Burke's concept of rhetoric, described in terms of "identification" and "consubstantiality": "A is not identical to his colleague B. But in to the extent that their interests are joined, A identifies with B. Or he can identify with B even when their interests are not joined, if he supposes that they are, or if he is convinced of believe it. […] By identifying with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than himself. But at the same time, it remains unique, an individual place of motivations. Thus, it is both joined and separated, both a distinct substance and consubstantial with another. (20-1)In other words, the idea of ​​consubstantiality is that we share the substances of our personal lives – our careers, our friends, our beliefs, our hobbies and even our possessions – with other people . It is in this sharing that we become consubstantial. Identifying “A” with “B” is “making A “consubstantial” with B” (21). Thus, establishing an idea of ​​consubstantiality allows us to establish a more precise idea of ​​a public: a group of individuals sharing particular substances. The idea of ​​identification is the method by which consubstantiality is established; we identify the substances shared with others and we accept the absence of other substances. Burke says: “Identification compensates for division. If men were not separated from one another, the rhetorician would have no need to proclaim their unity” (22). For Burke, identification is the basis of rhetorical action. “You only persuade a man to the extent that you can speak his language by word, gesture, tone, order, image, attitude, idea, by identifying your ways with his.” , he said (55). For Burke, identification is more than an element of persuasion; it's persuasion. Since identification is a transaction between the speaker and his audience (the speaker reads an audience to identify their respective substances), it is clear that the Burkean concept of rhetoric is most)..