A seemingly excited boy initiates Plato's Meno. Meno seems to have learned what virtue is and is eager to share this knowledge with the famous Socrates. Thus, Meno tactically asks calculated questions of Socrates: “…is virtue something that can be taught? Or does it come through practice? Or is it neither teaching nor practice that confers it on a man but a natural aptitude or something else? »[1] Meno's enthusiasm for discussing virtue is immediately apparent. Also, behind Meno's sincere and keen interest lies a somewhat arrogant desire to prove his knowledge to Socrates. But does Meno really know what he thinks he knows? Say no to plagiarism. Get a tailor-made essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”? Get an original essay On the other hand, we see a skeptical Socrates. He is very wary of accepting certain opinions, no matter how sensible they may seem. Socrates reproaches Gorgias for having acclimatized Meno to the habit of answering questions with confidence, as befits those who know: “sper eoV touV edta”.[2] Socrates frequently uses various forms of the verb “da” in this part of the dialogue. while referring to the knowledge of what virtue is. According to the Middle Liddell Lexicon, “edtaV” is the perfect participle of “da” – translated into the present tense – meaning “those who know.” Additionally, “oda” is related to “oraw” which means “to see or look”.[3] Therefore, "oda" tends to deal with what is known by being seen, not just by being thought. The process of “seeing” or “knowing” implied by the use of “oida” can be literal or metaphorical. Figuratively speaking, the thing in question could be perceived by the mind's eye, reflected upon, and perhaps eventually known. For this reason, “oida” could mean “to know by reflection or perception”. In light of this figurative definition, Socrates may be referring to these “people who know” – touV edta – as people who have insight into the being of something, as opposed to those who merely claim to know – even if they actually know it. don't know. Socrates sarcastically tells Meno that Meno speaks as if he knows, thus distinguishing Meno from those who actually know. These people who simply claim to know something do not really see the whole thing. They only see the different parts of a thing and assume that by seeing the parts they have seen the whole. This happens to be the case in Meno's analysis of virtue. Meno lists various examples of virtue but does not specify what virtue is. So Socrates said to him: “…do not suppose that you can explain it[4] to anyone in terms of its parts, or by any similar type of explanation. Rather understand that the same question remains unanswered; you say this and that about virtue, but what is it? »[5] Meno is expected to stop evading the question of interest and fully identify virtue. Still, it seems like Meno is struggling and trying his best. It is important to note that Meno begins this investigation of virtue in a very promising way. He doesn't seem stupid as people generally think. The atmosphere at the beginning of the dialogue is optimistic. The investigation of virtue did not seem difficult. Meno, with ease, makes his first attempt to say what virtue is. In summary, according to Meno, a man of virtue must be able to manage the affairs of the city and a woman of virtue must be a good housewife.[6] His second attempt is as enthusiastic as ever: “it must simply be about the ability to govern men. »[7] After Socrates refuted Meno's definition for the second time, Menoseems to be losing some of his confidence. He begins to realize that maybe he didn't have the knowledge he thinks he does. Although Meno is not often considered a smart boy, he embodies the virtue of perseverance. This positive attitude of Meno toward understanding the “being” of virtue is what keeps the dialogue going. It seems that Meno's difficulty in defining virtue is not due to stupidity but to the natural tendency to jump to multiplicity when discussing virtue. It could also be that virtue is somewhat immaterial, so that it cannot be defined as a material thing. During their dialogue, Socrates and Meno encounter several analogies, such as that of the swarm of bees, the analogy of shapes, etc. At first glance, these analogies seem useful in the quest for virtue. However, despite the apparent usefulness of these analogies, Meno struggles to map these analogies appropriately onto virtue itself. That is to say, connecting these analogies to virtue without generality. He knows how to approach virtue by discussing analogies, but he again enters into plurality by referring to virtue. What, then, makes a precise characterization of virtue more difficult than an analogical description? In other words, is virtue too broad to define? It seems that analogies do not guarantee understanding. However, analogies attempt to bring the reader closer to the meaning of something and, perhaps, make it easier to understand. Plato seems to accentuate the limits of analogical thinking in philosophy. A thought-provoking shift in vocabulary is seen when Socrates introduces “gignwskw” alongside “oida.” Socrates asks Meno if someone who does not know Meno would be able to describe him: “…st Ma µ se to parpa st estin, tt eda ete kaloV..”[8] Just like “da”, “gignwskw » also means “to know”. It is therefore difficult to specify the connotative difference between these two words. The Liddell and Scott Lexicon defines "gignwskw" with different words, including observe, understand, discern, distinguish, recognize, etc. Given the subtle distinction that Socrates is trying to make, however, it seems that "gignwskw" is related to discernment in observation, while "oida" has to do with reflection on observation. Socrates attempts to show that one must be able to observe (gignwskw) the personality of Meno in order to know or see his attributes. Thus, if someone is not able to distinguish Meno from another male, that person will also not be able to characterize Meno. Another interesting use of “gignwskw” – but this time alongside “oiomai” – appears in section 77 of the dialogue. Meno makes his third attempt to explain what virtue is. In the words of a poet, Meno defined virtue as “desiring beautiful things and being able to acquire them”.[9] Socrates, however, rejects this definition by emphasizing that everyone, even the most unvirtuous, desires good things. Socrates illustrates that people only desire something bad when they confuse evil with good. No one, seeing clearly that something is wrong, will want this. Before arriving at this conclusion, Socrates asks: “µe ta kaka aa ea, legeiV, kai gignwskonteV t kaka estin µ pµs at; » This translates into English as: "And would you say that others assume evils to be good, or do they still desire them even though they recognize them as evil?" » [10] Here, a contrast is made between the brutal supposition – oiomai – and reality. recognition—gignwskw. Socrates points out that assuming something presents itself a certain way is not enough to make someone knowledgeable. Additionally, “oiomai,” according to the Liddell and Scott Lexicon, primarily translates to: “ 3-4