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  • Essay / Williams suggests that the practical reasons depend...

    If there is one theme in all my work, it is that of authenticity and self-expression… It is the idea that some things, in a real sense, are really you, or express what you and others are not…. It is simply a matter of clarifying the notion of internal necessity. Bernard Williams 2002 Human action is preceded by mental states. One of these states is “being motivated”. We say you have to be motivated to act. David Hume, Donald Davidson, and Harry Frankfurt claim that motivations are and are nothing but desires. A second state consists of giving "practical reasons" for what we have done or are about to do, the content of which is the belief that the action we are about to do, or have done , will satisfy or has done, will satisfy the objects of motivation. . Within this general school of thought, Bernard Williams proposes a naturalistic "practical reason", of normative force, based on what he would say is the psychological reality of being motivated to act and the essential human psychological characteristic of making utterances reasoned for this action; that is, to be rational. Being rational, we discover statements of reason that explain what we do. Being fully rational, we must connect our reasons to our motivations and do so through a robust deliberative process. In this framework, a reason statement is not just the discovery of an explanation for why an action was taken in the belief that it would satisfy a motivational object, but that it is an effective action based on correct facts and beliefs for this purpose. defensible by a logical argument. From a different perspective, Williams' project separates the normative force of practical reason from its psychological foundation attributed to Enlightenment reason to the extent that reason has no force... middle of article. ..... 1981 .———. “Internal Reasons and the Darkness of Blame.” In Making sense of humanity: and other philosophical articles 1982-1993, xii, 251 p. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.———. “Moral luck.” In Moral Luck: Philosophical Articles, 1973-1980. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Originally published as Williams, Bernard Arthur Owen, Moral Luck in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume I (1976). 115-35.).———. Moral luck: philosophical articles, 1973-1980. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.———. “Answers.” In World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, edited by JEJ Altham and Ross Harrison, viii, 229 p. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.Žižek, Slavoj. Parallax view, short circuits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.