This article aims to discuss why Nike's audit of its global supply chain factories is not sufficient to ensure lasting improvements in working conditions. Working conditions include "a range of areas, including working hours, information and consultation of workers, health and safety at work, as well as conditions for part-time, full-time and agency workers temporary work”. (European Commission, 2014, p.3)Say no to plagiarism. Get a custom essay on “Why Violent Video Games Should Not Be Banned”?Get the original essay For reasons of relevance to the topic of Nike's global supply chain factories, this article focuses on working hours and occupational health and safety, as these are the main concerns of factory workers. This essay will first describe compliance scores, then discuss the country factor, limitations of management audits, and strategic suppliers. The paper's main argument is that the audit was found to be insufficient due to financial and technological constraints and an imperfect audit system. Nike has faced criticism and public relations disasters since the 1980s for manufacturing its products in countries with poor working conditions by underpaid workers (Locke, RM, 2002, p.9) . In response, Nike conducted audits by its own labor specialists and external consultants (Locke, RM, 2002, p. 17). However, audit results showed that these efforts did not generate the level of improvements that many hoped for. Nike's own Factory Compliance Rating (CR) program is an A-D rating system assigned to suppliers based on audits and inspections conducted by Nike and Fair Labor Association (FLA) staff. (FLA, 2008, p.10). The rating reflects the results of three types of audits that a Nike factory must undergo: an environmental, safety and health audit (SHAPE), a management audit (M-audit) and inspections by the FLA (Locke RM , Qin F. and Brause). A., 2007, p.18). The CR grades show that working conditions have not improved. Nearly half (42%) of CR scores remained the same and 36% of them even decreased (Locke, RM, Kochan T., Romis M., & Qin F., 2007, p. 31). Nike has invested heavily in developing audit protocols and training its staff, as well as working with third parties to improve working conditions (Locke RM, Qin F. and Brause A., 2007, p. 17 ). So why haven't workers seen lasting improvements in working conditions at factories across Nike's global supply chain, despite the efforts of Nike and the FLA? According to Locke, Qin, and Brause (2007), factories in the Americas and the Europe-Middle East-Africa (EMEA) region performed better in management audits (M-audits), often achieving scores above 50. %, unlike those in the North. and their South Asian counterparts, who recorded significantly more dispersed results. Most of Nike's largest factories that hire the most workers are located in developing countries, with China and Indonesia taking the top two spots with over 170,000 and 100,000 workers employed, respectively (Locke, RM , 2002, p. Working conditions in factories in these countries with weaker legal and regulatory systems are on average worse (Locke, RM, 2002, p.15). Inspectors are unable to enforce labor laws and standards in these countries (Locke, RM, 2002, p.20). ByFor example, when Locke and Romis (2007) studied the working conditions of a Mexican factory manufacturing products for Nike, it was found during interviews and M audits that its workers are expected and even forced to work more of 60 hours per week, which is above the legal limit in Mexico and does not comply with Nike's code of conduct. However, working overtime is one of the ways workers can increase their low wages. So it makes sense that workers accept overwork as the norm. It can be argued that the Mexican supplier simply has no incentive to change the excess overtime issue because its workers lack bargaining power, and neither Mexican regulators nor Nike have taken action against the factory. , although it has a CR rating of D, which indicates a “critical” violation of the labor code (Distelhorst G., Hainmueller J., Locke RM, 2014, p.714). Nike's audit found compliance issues at many of its subcontractors in developing countries, but it is not always easy for them to strictly adhere to the code of conduct, due to technological and financial constraints , they might not have the capacity to meet Nike's demand without overworking its workers. For Nike, whose American factory workers earn 76 times more per hour than their Indonesian counterparts (Ghogomu M., 2015), it can be argued that Nike is accountable to its shareholders by continuing to operate its supply chain factories in Indonesia rather than ceasing to exploit them. work with these low-cost suppliers, despite lower labor standards. The audit alone has very limited meaningful impact on working conditions when neither suppliers nor Nike act on the results. One of the main auditing processes used by Nike is M-audit. It provides a detailed assessment of labor management practices and working conditions in factories, covering more than 80 elements, including the treatment and compensation of workers (Locke RM and Romis M., 2007, p. 57). However, this means that two plants can benefit from similar treatment. scores even when they have very different working conditions and different types of compliance issues, generating misleading results. In research by Locke and Romis (2007), two Mexican factories (plant A and factory B) with comparable M audit scores but very different CR scores (in terms of flavor from factory A) were compared, and it was found that workers in factory A are paid more and work less overtime and the management style of factory A is also more participative while that of factory B is more autocratic, which results in significantly higher job satisfaction in factory A. The M audit also focuses on documentary evidence and company records. Since factories are informed in advance before an M-audit is performed, suppliers can also perform better by preparing documents and even coaching their workers (Locke, RM, 2007, p. 20), which makes M-audit results considerably less reliable. The documentary evidence shows exactly where Factory B performed well and where Factory A failed. Since the CR rating system is more of a subjective assessment, compliance personnel cannot be easily deceived when visiting factories and witnessing working conditions. Therefore, the apparent improvement in M ​​audits (Locke, RM, Qin F. and Brause A., 2007, p.17) does not necessarily translate into a real improvement in working conditions. THE.