There are important reasons why Marshal Rundstedt's operational concept for defending against the Allied invasion of France was superior to that of Marshal Rommel and could have changed the course of the war. Geographically, Rundstedt's concept offered the Germans the best chance of defeating the Allied advance. Operationally, he took into account several military and intelligence assessment considerations that gave his plan the advantage. From a strategic and political perspective, had Hitler been willing to negotiate peace, a major Allied defeat in France delivered by Rundstedt's plan would have given Germany its last chance at victory. If Rommel had assessed the French coastline and countryside correctly, he would probably have sided with Rundstedt. “It was clear to von Rundstedt that 2,600 kilometers of coastline could not be made impregnable…” (Ose, 8 years old) According to Rundstedt, the best strategy for defending the coast “called for using an offensive defense by operating behind the coast of strong armored divisions. , strictly controlled and flexibly directed. (Ose, 9) The geographic challenges evident along the coast meant that Rommel's plan to be decisive with armored divisions would have given the German army little chance of success. The first major problem with Rommel's plan was the length of coastline which would have been impossible to defend if he had not been lucky enough to determine the exact time and location of the attack. The long French coastline had already overtaken German forces and their defenses were weakening due to engagements elsewhere in the European theater. (Cubbage, 149) Even with Rommel's plan to create numerous obstacles along the coast, it seems he "forgot that a concrete and steel barrier with workable strength...... in the middle of paper......allows you to defeat the Allied invasion of France. After examining each operational concept, it becomes clear that Rundstedt's plan would have given the German army the best chance of success. In the summer of 1944, a decisive victory over Allied forces in France could have brought Britain and the United States to the negotiating table. A decisive victory would also have given the Germans more forces on the Eastern Front. Additional forces in the East could have stopped the Soviet advance and could also have brought Stalin to the negotiating table. Given these possibilities, we know in hindsight that it would have been unlikely that Hitler or the Allies would have accepted anything other than total victory. In other words, the operational success offered by Rundstedt's plan would not have translated into strategic victory given the determination of Hitler and the Allies..