Frederick II, the Great, overcame resource limitations within Prussia by mastering three aspects of the Western way of waging war: the ability to finance war , the possession of a highly disciplined army and an aggressive mindset aimed at achieving a quick decisive victory, which made Prussia a major European power. Frederick II accomplished this feat while surrounded by powerful neighbors with larger populations, armies, and financial excess. His initial assessment of the state of his Prussian heritage, drawn from his personal writings, is as follows:...cast your eyes on the map, and you will see that the greater part of my territories are scattered...cannot help each other... At least a third of my estates are in ruins; another third is found in woods, waters or marshes.… the third which is cultivated produces neither wine, nor olives, nor mulberry trees. Prussian economic policy used an internal revenue system consisting of various taxes and tolls for the sole purpose of supporting an armed standing position. Aware of the limited resource base on which Prussia had to rely, Frederick II achieved a synergistic resource effect through his choice of strategic objectives, limiting his internal recruitment base and using his army in peacetime for social purposes. The resource-rich state of Silesia remained Frederick the Great's main strategic objective, its possession would significantly increase Prussia's economic capacity. The Prussian army relied on the service of mercenaries and, by plan, minimized the reliance on the townspeople of the Prussian rulers to fulfill any remaining requirements and required only short terms of service. This approach to staffing had two economic advantages: it maximized the number of people left behind in the paper civilizations, its use by Frederick II is what secured Prussian power and earned him the title Frederick the Great. By day, they lined up their forces in long linear formations which, once in place, were very difficult to control. The oblique order was a version of a flanking attack in which Frederick II secured one end of the enemy formation and then flanked an assault force to deadly effect. Works Cited Heinrich Von Treitschke, The Confessions of Frederick the Great and the Life of Frederick the Great (Maryland: Wildside Press LLC, 2010) 37-38. Margaret Shennan, The Rise of Brandenburg-Prussia (New York: Routledge, 1995) 31 .Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art 1740-1813: from Frederick the Great to Napoleon (New York: Routledge, 2005) 7. Geoffrey Parker, The Cambridge History of Warfare (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 181.